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Abstract
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is a fast-growing wireless tech-
nology with a large number of potential use cases, particularly
in the IoT domain. Increasingly, these use cases require the
storage of sensitive user data or critical device controls on
the BLE device, as well as the access of this data by an aug-
mentative mobile application. Uncontrolled access to such
data could violate user privacy, cause a device to malfunction,
or even endanger lives. The BLE standard provides security
mechanisms such as pairing and bonding to protect sensitive
data such that only authenticated devices can access it. In this
paper we show how unauthorized co-located Android appli-
cations can access pairing-protected BLE data, without the
user’s knowledge. We discuss mitigation strategies in terms of
the various stakeholders involved in this ecosystem, and argue
that at present, the only possible option for securing BLE data
is for BLE developers to implement remedial measures in the
form of application-layer security between the BLE device
and the Android application. We introduce BLECryptracer,
a tool for identifying the presence of such application-layer
security, and present the results of a large-scale static anal-
ysis over 18,900+ BLE-enabled Android applications. Our
findings indicate that over 45% of these applications do not
implement measures to protect BLE data, and that cryptog-
raphy is sometimes applied incorrectly in those that do. This
implies that a potentially large number of corresponding BLE
peripheral devices are vulnerable to unauthorized data access.
1 Introduction
Bluetooth is a well-known technology standard for wireless
data transfer, currently deployed in billions of devices world-
wide [37]. A more recent addition to the Bluetooth standard
is Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), which differs from Classic
Bluetooth in that it incorporates a simplified version of the
Bluetooth stack and targets low-energy, low-cost devices.
Its focus on resource-constrained devices has made BLE
highly suited for IoT applications [18], including personal
health/fitness monitoring [22], asset tracking [8], vehicular
management [13], and home automation [27]. Most of these
use cases augment the functionality of the BLE device with
a mobile application. This application may need to read or
write sensitive or critical data on the BLE device (for example,
glucose measurement values stored by a continuous glucose
meter, or a field that controls a door’s locking mechanism
in a smart home security system). To ensure privacy and
security/safety, measures should be taken to protect such data
from being accessed by unauthorized entities.
The Bluetooth specification provides means for restricting
access to BLE data via pairing and bonding, which are mech-
anisms for establishing an authenticated transport between
two communicating devices. However, when multiple appli-
cations reside on a single host, as is the case with mobile
devices, there is potential for a malicious application to abuse
a trusted relationship between the host and the device that
was initiated by an authorized application [31].
In this work, we show how a malicious application could
take advantage of the BLE communication model on Android
to read and write pairing-protected data on a BLE device
without the user’s knowledge. We also show that these unau-
thorized applications may be able to do so while requesting
minimal permissions, thereby making them appear less inva-
sive than even an authorized application.
We discuss various strategies, in terms of the different stake-
holders involved, that can be used to secure BLE data against
such unauthorized access. We argue that in the current land-
scape, it is up to the BLE device/application developers to im-
plement application-layer security to protect the data on their
devices. We perform a large-scale static analysis of 18,929
BLE-enabled Android applications (filtered down from an
original dataset of over 4.6 million applications) to determine
how many of them currently employ such protection mecha-
nisms. While the results vary for BLE reads vs. writes, overall
they show that more than 45% of the tested applications do
not provide cryptography-based application-layer security for
BLE data. This number rises to about 70% for those applica-
tions that are categorized under “Medical”. This information,
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Figure 1: GATT communications between a mobile phone
and a BLE-enabled glucometer.
when combined with the download counts for each applica-
tion, allows us to estimate a lower bound for the number of
BLE devices that may be vulnerable to unauthorized data
access.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2
provides an overview of key BLE concepts, particularly with
regard to data access mechanisms and restrictions. We demon-
strate unauthorized BLE data access in Section 3. This section
also discusses stakeholders and possible mitigation strategies.
Section 4 details our marketplace application analysis and
examines the results. Related work is described in Section 5,
and Section 6 provides our concluding remarks.
2 Background
Two devices that communicate using BLE will operate in
an asymmetric configuration, with the more powerful device,
referred to as the central, taking on most of the resource-
intensive work. The resource-constrained device is termed the
peripheral and performs tasks that are designed to consume
fewer resources.
2.1 Data Access on BLE Devices
BLE, unlike Classic Bluetooth, can only handle discrete data
known as attributes. Attributes are stored and accessed ac-
cording to rules specified by the Attribute Protocol (ATT)
and the Generic Attribute Profile (GATT), both of which are
defined in the Bluetooth standard. There are different types of
attributes, of which characteristics are the most relevant for
our analysis, as they hold the actual data of interest. Related
characteristics are grouped into services, which are exposed
to connected devices [11].
When one BLE-enabled device wants to access attributes
on another BLE device, the device that initiates the exchange
takes on the role of GATT client and the other acts as the
GATT server. In this paper, we focus on the scenario where
the BLE peripheral (e.g., a glucose meter), acts as the server,
and a mobile phone acts as the client, as shown in Figure 1.
2.2 BLE Attribute Permissions
Every attribute has associated with it three permissions that
control how it may be accessed: (1) Access permissions define
whether an attribute can be read and/or written. (2) Authen-
tication permissions indicate the level of authentication and
encryption that needs to be applied to the transport between
the two devices before the attribute can be accessed. (3) Autho-
rization permissions specify whether end-user authorization
is required for access.
When a GATT client sends a read or write request for an
attribute to a GATT server, the server will check the request
against the permissions for that attribute, to determine whether
the requested access mechanism is allowed and whether the
client is authenticated and/or authorized, if required. An at-
tribute is only readable or writable if its access permissions
specify it to be so. In the case of authentication permissions,
if the attribute requires an authenticated or encrypted link
before it can be accessed (referred to as a “pairing-protecte”
attribute in this paper), and if such a link is not present when
the access request is made, then the server responds with
an Insufficient Authentication/Encryption message.
At this point, the client can initiate the pairing process to
authenticate and encrypt the transport. If this process com-
pletes successfully, the server will fulfill subsequent requests
made by the client. This procedure for handling authentica-
tion requirements is well-defined in the Bluetooth specifi-
cation. Authorization requirements, on the other hand, are
implementation-specific and largely left up to developers.
Once two devices complete the pairing process, they typi-
cally go through an additional bonding process, during which
long-term keys are established. This prevents the need for go-
ing through the pairing process again if they disconnect and
subsequently reconnect, provided they retain the long-term
keys. Upon re-connection, the link encryption process will be
initiated using the stored keys. Keys normally remain on the
devices unless the devices are reset or manually unpaired by
the user.
3 BLE Co-located Application Attacks
In this section, we show how any application on an Android
device can access pairing-protected attributes from a BLE
peripheral, even when the pairing process was initiated by
a different application. We then explore various mitigation
strategies that are available to different stakeholders in the
BLE ecosystem.
These attacks were also explored by Naveed et al. in 2014,
for Classic Bluetooth [31]. We show that the problem remains
on newer versions of Android, and also that the situation is
worse for BLE, as one of our attacks enables fewer restrictions
for access and requires fewer permissions of the malicious
application than even of the official application.
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3.1 Attack Mechanisms
We describe two attacks: the first shows that pairing-protected
data can be accessed by unauthorized applications, while the
second refines the attack and reduces the number of permis-
sions required by the unauthorized application. We use two
Android applications to describe the attacks: One application
that is expected to be able to connect to the BLE device and
access its data (“OfficialApp”), and a different application
that should not be able to access pairing-protected data from
the device (“AttackApp”). We conducted our experiments on
an Alcatel Pixi 4 mobile phone, running Android 6.0, and
on a Google Pixel XL, running Android 8.1.0. Version 6.0
was the most widely-deployed release [2], while 8.1.0 was
the latest stable release, as of 01 Aug 2018.
3.1.1 Attack 1: System-wide Pairing Credentials
This attack demonstrates that the BLE credentials that are
stored on an Android device are implicitly available to all
applications on the device, rather than just the application that
originally triggered the pairing.
When the OfficialApp connects to the BLE device and
attempts to access a pairing-protected characteristic, the re-
sulting exchange will trigger the Android OS into initiating
the pairing and bonding process (as depicted in the upper
block in Figure 2). The resultant keys are associated with
the link between the Android and BLE devices, rather than
between the BLE device and the OfficialApp (which actually
triggered the pairing). Therefore, once bonding completes,
when the AttackApp scans and connects to the BLE device,
the Android OS completes the connection process and au-
tomatically initiates link encryption with the keys that were
generated during the previous bonding process (lower block
in Figure 2). This enables the AttackApp to have the same
level of access to the pairing-protected data on the device as
the OfficialApp, but without the need for initiating pairing.
A key point to note here is that, not only is the unauthorized
AttackApp able to access potentially sensitive information
from the BLE device, but also the user is likely to be unaware
of the fact that this data access is taking place, as there is no
indication during link re-encryption and subsequent attribute
access.
3.1.2 Attack 2: Reuse of Connection
Our second attack exploits the fact that, on Android, a BLE
peripheral can be used concurrently by multiple applica-
tions [32]. In this attack, the AttackApp does not scan for BLE
devices. It instead searches for connected BLE devices us-
ing the BluetoothManager.getConnectedDevices() API
call, with BluetoothProfile.GATT as the argument. If the
OfficialApp happens to be in communication with the BLE
device at the same time, this call will return a list with a ref-
erence to the connected BLE device. The AttackApp is then
Apps Android OS BLE
startLeScan()
Scan
<device list>
connect()
Create Connection
Connection Complete
onConnect
readCharacteristic() Read Request: <protectedChar>
Error: Insufficient Authentication
Pairing, Link Encryption, Bonding
Read Request: <protectedChar>
Read Response: <value>
onRead
getValue()
<value>
close()
Disconnect
OfficialApp
startLeScan()
Scan
<device list>
connect()
Create Connection
Connection Complete
Link Encryption
readCharacteristic() Read Request: <protectedChar>
Read Response: <value>
onRead
getValue()
<value>
AttackApp
Figure 2: Attack 1 - Illustrative message exchange depicting
access of pairing-protected data by unauthorized application.
Note: Dashed lines indicate encrypted traffic.
able to directly connect to the GATT server and read and write
to the characteristics on it (including those that are pairing-
protected), without the need for creating a new connection to
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the peripheral. This again is done surreptitiously, without the
user being aware of the data access. An illustrative message
flow where the AttackApp writes to a protected characteris-
tic on the BLE device (which the OfficialApp subsequently
reads) has been depicted in Figure 3.
An interesting observation from this attack is a subtle but
relevant impact it has on user awareness, due to the different
permissions that need to be requested by the two applications.
Since both applications access data from a GATT server, they
both require BLUETOOTH permissions. In this attack scenario,
because the OfficialApp scans for the BLE device before it
connects to it, it also needs to request the BLUETOOTH_ADMIN
permission. Both BLUETOOTH and BLUETOOTH_ADMIN are
“normal” permissions that are granted automatically by the
Android operating system after installation, without any need
for user interaction. However, due to restrictions imposed
from Android version 6.0 onward, the OfficialApp also needs
to request LOCATION permissions to invoke the BLE scanner
without a filter (i.e., to scan for all nearby devices instead of
a particular device). These permissions are classed as “dan-
gerous” and will prompt the system to display a confirmation
dialog box the first time they are required. Because the Attack-
App merely has to query the Android OS for a list of already
connected devices, it does not require these additional permis-
sions. This makes the AttackApp appear to be less invasive
in the eyes of a user, since it does not request any permission
that involves user privacy. This could play a part in determin-
ing the volume of downloads for a malicious application. For
example, a malicious application that masquerades as a gam-
ing application, and which does not request any dangerous
permissions, may be more likely to be downloaded by end
users as opposed to one that requests location permissions.
3.2 Discussion
In this section we discuss the impact of our findings, com-
pare them with the Classic Bluetooth case, and mention some
attack limitations.
3.2.1 Implications of Attack
In both of our experiments, the AttackApp was able to read
and write pairing-protected data from the BLE device. The
simplest form of attack would then be for a malicious applica-
tion to perform unauthorized reads of personal user data (as
an example) and relay this to a remote server.
We verified the practicability of this attack by testing a
BLE-enabled fitness tracker that implemented the Bluetooth
Heart Rate Service. According to the service specification,
characteristics within this service are only supposed to be
protected by pairing [9]. However, we observed that the pair-
ing employed by the device appeared to be a non-standard
implementation, and also that access to the Heart Rate Mea-
surement characteristic was “locked” and had to be “unlocked”
Apps Android OS BLE
startLeScan()
Scan
<device list>
connect()
Create Connection
Connection Complete
onConnect
readCharacteristic() Read Request: <protectedChar>
Error: Insufficient Authentication
Pairing, Link Encryption, Bonding
Read Request: <protectedChar>
Read Response: <value>
onRead
getValue()
<value>
getConnectedDevices()
<device list>
connectGatt()
onConnect
writeCharacteristic()
Write Request:
<protectedChar, value2>
Write Response: success
onWrite
AttackApp
readCharacteristic() Read Request: <protectedChar>
Read Response: <value2>
onRead
getValue()
<value2>
OfficialApp
Figure 3: Attack 2 - Illustrative message exchange depicting
the access of pairing-protected data by reusing an existing
connection. Note: Dashed lines indicate encrypted traffic.
by first writing to certain other characteristics on the tracker.
Despite this, we found that by deploying our second attack,
our AttackApp was able to obtain Heart Rate Measurement
readings without the need for performing any “unlocking”.
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This is because the AttackApp connects to the GATT server
by reusing an existing connection that was initiated by the
official application. The unlocking procedure would therefore
already have been performed for that connection by the offi-
cial application. This result shows that artificially restricting
access to data using non-cryptographic means will not be
effective. We notified the device developer of this issue on 01
Nov 2018, but have not yet received a response.
It should be noted that the above attack could be used by a
malicious application to target other sensitive health informa-
tion such as ECG, glucose or blood pressure measurements
from vulnerable BLE devices, to build up a profile on a user’s
health. Further, Smart Home devices and BLE-enabled ve-
hicles may hold information on a user’s habits and lifestyle
(e.g., time at home, alcohol consumption, driving speed), and
could be exploited. It may also be possible for a malicious ap-
plication to overwrite values on the BLE device, such that the
written data either causes unexpected behavior on the device,
or is read back by the legitimate application, thereby giving
the user an incorrect view of the data on the peripheral. For ex-
ample, it may be possible to update the peripheral’s firmware
via GATT writes. If this mechanism is not suitably protected,
then a malicious application could potentially install mali-
cious firmware onto the BLE device, as we demonstrate in
Section 4.6.
3.2.2 Comparison with Classic Bluetooth
In their experiments with Classic Bluetooth, Naveed et al.
found that an unauthorized Android application would not
be able to obtain data from a Classic Bluetooth device if
the authorized application had already established a socket
connection with the device, as only one application can be
in communication with the device at one time. Therefore, a
malicious application would either require some side-channel
information in order to determine the correct moment for data
access, or would need to interfere with the existing connec-
tion, thereby potentially alerting the user [31]. This limits the
attack window for the malicious application. Our experiments
show that this is not the case with BLE communication chan-
nels. With BLE, there are no socket connections and if the
official application has established a connection with the BLE
device, then this connection can be utilized by any application
that is running on the Android device. That is, a malicious ap-
plication does not have to wait for the authorized application
to disconnect before it can access data.
3.2.3 Attack Limitations
The main limitation for the AttackApp in the case of
the first attack is that it requires the BLUETOOTH and
BLUETOOTH_ADMIN permissions in its manifest, and also
needs to explicitly request LOCATION permissions at first run-
time in order to be able to invoke the BLE scanner. This
enables the AttackApp to connect to the BLE device regard-
less of whether or not another application is also connected,
but increases the risk of raising a user’s suspicions.
In the second attack scenario, the obvious limitation for the
AttackApp that requests only the BLUETOOTH permission is
that the application will only be able to access data from the
BLE peripheral when the peripheral is already in a connection
with (another application on) the Android device. That is, data
access will have to be opportunistic. This can be achieved,
for example, by periodically polling for a list of connected
devices.
3.3 Stakeholders, Mitigation Strategies and
Awareness
In this section, we discuss potential mitigating strategies that
different stakeholders within the BLE ecosystem could im-
plement in order to prevent the attacks detailed in Section 3.1.
We consider the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG), An-
droid (i.e., Google), and BLE device/application developers
as stakeholders.
3.3.1 Bluetooth SIG
The Bluetooth SIG is the group that is responsible for defining
and maintaining the Bluetooth standard, which provides de-
tails on pairing, bonding and BLE attribute permissions. The
SIG also defines various BLE services, including some that
handle user health information, e.g., the Heart Rate Service
and the Continuous Glucose Monitoring Service. The Blue-
tooth specifications for these services require only pairing
as a protection mechanism for the characteristics that hold
health-related measurements [9, 10]. This protection is in-
tended to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks and eavesdropping.
However, as shown in Section 3.1, pairing will not prevent
unauthorized Android applications from accessing the sensi-
tive data held in these characteristics.
This issue could be avoided by modifying the Bluetooth
specification and introducing specific security measures for
protecting data at higher layers. However, this would require
changes to all devices within the ecosystem, which may not be
feasible due to the sheer volume of devices and applications
currently available, and which could lead to fragmentation and
reduced interoperability. Despite this, we believe that devel-
opers accessing Bluetooth documentation should at least be
made aware of the risks involved, and have therefore notified
the SIG via their Support Request Form (17 Dec 2018). We
were informed (19 Dec 2018) that the case had been assigned
to the appropriate team for assessment.
3.3.2 Android
Allowing all applications on an Android device to share BLE
communication channels and long-term keys may well be by
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design, particularly since the BLE standard does not provide
explicit mechanisms for selectively allowing or denying ac-
cess to data based on the source application. This model may
work in some situations, for example on a platform where all
applications originate from the same trusted source. However,
the Android ecosystem is such that, many of the applica-
tions on a device are from different and potentially untrusted
sources. In this scenario, providing all applications with ac-
cess to a common BLE transport opens up possibilities for
attack, as we have demonstrated.
One option to eliminate the problem is to modify how
Android handles BLE communication channels. The modifi-
cation would require some form of association between BLE
credentials and the application that triggers the pairing/bond-
ing process. Each data access request would then be checked
against the permissions associated with the requesting ap-
plication. This approach is favoured by Naveed et al., who
propose a re-architected Android framework which will create
a bonding policy when an application triggers pairing with a
Bluetooth device [31]. This strategy has the advantage that
Bluetooth devices will be protected by default from unautho-
rized access to their data. Further, assuming a suitably strong
pairing mechanism is used, a minimum level of security will
also be guaranteed. However, not only will the operating sys-
tem(s) need to be modified, but also a mechanism will be
required for ensuring that all users’ mobile devices are up-
dated. Otherwise, it is fairly likely that this measure will result
in a fragmented ecosystem, with some devices running the
modified operating system with protection mechanisms, and
others running older versions of the OS with no protection.
Regardless of whether or not the above measure is imple-
mented, we believe that developers should be made aware of
the possibility of unauthorized applications accessing their
BLE device data. At present, Android does not mention the
issue in its Developer Guide [3]. In fact, to the best of the
authors’ knowledge, there is only a single document, from
a BLE chipset manufacturer, which explicitly references the
fact that multiple Android applications can simultaneously
use a connection to a BLE device [32]. Apart from this, the
risks of “system-wide pairing” have been mentioned in a
specification issued by the Fast ID Online (FIDO) Alliance,
without specific reference to mobile platforms [20].
We submitted an issue to the Android Security Team on
02 Nov 2018, focusing on the need of clear documentation
so that developers are aware of the need for implementing
additional protection measures if they are handling sensitive
BLE data. The issue was reviewed by the security team and
rated as Moderate severity (16 May 2019), based on Android’s
severity assessment matrix [5].
3.3.3 BLE Device/Application Developers
Despite the BLE stack containing an application layer, it could
be argued that BLE is commonly viewed as a lower-layer tech-
nology for providing wireless communication capabilities, on
top of which higher-layer technologies operate [12, 38]. This
would result in the responsibility of securing user data being
transferred from the Bluetooth SIG or Android to the BLE
application/device developers. At any rate, this is the only
mechanism available at present for protecting data against
access by co-located applications.
That is, rather than relying solely on the pairing provided
by the underlying operating system, developers can imple-
ment end-to-end security from their Android application to
the BLE peripheral firmware. It may be possible to achieve
such behavior via BLE authorization permissions, because
even though their purpose is to specify a requirement for
end user authorization, the behavior of BLE devices when
encountering authorization requirements is implementation-
specific. Most modern BLE chipsets implement authorization
capabilities by intercepting read/write requests to the pro-
tected characteristics, and allowing for developer-specified
validation.
One advantage of this method is that it gives the developer
complete control over the strength of protection that is applied
to BLE device data, as well as over the timings of security
updates. However, leaving the implementation of security to
the developer runs the risk of cryptography being applied
improperly, thereby leaving the data vulnerable [17]. For
existing developments, retrofitting application-layer security
would mean that both an update for the Android application
and a firmware update for the BLE device would be required,
and there is a risk that the BLE firmware update procedure
itself may not be secure [6].
Due to the lack of clear guidelines regarding attribute secu-
rity in both the Android Developer Guide and the Bluetooth
specification, it is also possible that developers implement no
security at all, due to an assumption that protection will be
handled by pairing. In the next section, we test this assertion
of a lack of developer awareness by exploring the current state
of application-layer security deployments via a large-scale
analysis of BLE-enabled Android applications.
4 Marketplace Application Analysis
As evidenced by our experiments, it is fairly straightforward
for any Android application to connect to a BLE device and
read or write pairing-protected data. As discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3, the only strategy available at present is for developers
to implement application-layer security, typically in the form
of cryptographic protection, between the Android application
and the BLE peripheral.
In this section, we identify the proportion of applications
that do not implement such security mechanisms, to demon-
strate a possible lack of awareness surrounding the issue, and
to be able to estimate the number of devices that are poten-
tially vulnerable to the types of attack shown in Section 3.1.
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Table 1: APKs and Downloads per Google Play Category
Category APKs [packages] Downloads(mn)
Health & Fitness 3012 [1263] 344.95
Lifestyle 1501 [1006] 52.60
Business 1489 [950] 39.62
Tools 1428 [891] 6308.62
Sports 1268 [685] 17.74
Travel & Local 948 [545] 31.83
Productivity 526 [305] 43.05
Entertainment 446 [284] 128.41
Music & Audio 406 [239] 51.48
Education 313 [225] 3.35
Shopping 383 [190] 144.87
Maps & Navigation 348 [181] 33.21
Medical 407 [177] 5.68
Communication 395 [146] 755.89
Finance 259 [126] 96.38
Auto & Vehicles 236 [119] 4.13
Food & Drink 146 [87] 6.23
Photography 114 [80] 45.78
Social 203 [77] 663.43
Other 746 [516] 258.41
a We make the assumption that all versions of an application
fall under the same category.
b Some APKs within the dataset are no longer available on
Google Play and hence, have no corresponding category.
These have not been included.
To identify the presence of application-layer security, there
are two possible targets for analysis: BLE peripheral firmware
or Android applications. At present, there is no public reposi-
tory of BLE firmware, which means that the firmware would
need to be obtained from the peripherals themselves. This
would necessitate the purchase of a large number of de-
vices and would not be financially viable. Further, reverse-
engineering and analyzing BLE firmware is not straightfor-
ward, as the firmware image is usually a .hex file, which can
typically only be converted to binary or assembly. Android
APKs, on the other hand, are easier to obtain, and a number
of decompilers exist that allow for conversion of APKs to a
human-readable format.
We therefore target Android applications for our analysis
and perform the following: (1) obtain a substantial dataset of
BLE-enabled Android APKs, (2) determine the BLE method
calls and the cryptography libraries of interest, and (3) define
a mechanism to determine whether BLE reads and writes
make use of cryptographically processed data. We then apply
this mechanism to our dataset and analyze the results.
4.1 APK Dataset
We obtained our dataset from the AndroZoo project [1]. This
is an online repository that has been made available for re-
search purposes and which contains APKs from several differ-
ent application marketplaces. We focus on only those APKs
that were retrieved from the official Google Play store, which
nevertheless resulted in a sizeable dataset of over 4.6 million
APKs. This dataset includes multiple versions for each ap-
plication, as well as applications that are no longer available
on the marketplace. We performed our analysis over the en-
tire dataset, rather than focusing on only those APKs that
are currently available on Google Play. This was in part be-
cause older versions of an application may still be residing
on users’ devices, and in part to be able to identify trends in
application-layer security deployments over time.
As we are only interested in those applications that per-
form BLE attribute access, and because such access always
requires communicating with the GATT server on the BLE
peripheral, the APKs were filtered by the BLUETOOTH permis-
sion declaration and by calls to the connectGatt method,
which is called prior to performing any data reads or writes.
18,929 APKs, comprising 11,067 unique packages1, from the
original set of 4,600,000+ APKs satisfy this criteria, and these
formed our final dataset.
Application Categories
Applications are categorized in Google Play according to their
primary function, such as “Productivity” or “Entertainment”,
and it may be possible to gauge the sensitivity of the BLE data
handled by an application based on the category it falls under.
For example, “Health and Fitness” applications are probably
more likely to hold personal user data than “Entertainment”
applications.
The number of APKs per category has been listed in Table 1
for our dataset. Approximately 23% of the APKs (18% of
unique applications) fall under the categories of “Health and
Fitness” and “Medical”, with a cumulative download count
of over 350 million. Note that the disproportionately high
volume of downloads for the category “Tools” is due to the
Google and Google Play applications, which include BLE
capabilities and are installed on most Android devices.
4.2 Identification of BLE Methods and
Crypto-Libraries
We perform our analysis against specific BLE methods
and crypto-libraries. When considering BLE methods, we
focus on those methods that involve data writes and
1An Android application may have many versions, each of which will be
a separate APK file (with a unique SHA256 hash), but all of which will have
the same package name. We use the terms “unique applications” or “unique
packages” to denote the set of APKs that contain only the latest version of
each application.
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Table 2: BLE Data Access Methods
Access Method Signaturea #APKs % of Total Methodsb
Read
byte[] getValue () 17896 61.58%
Integer getIntValue (int, int) 8051 27.70%
String getStringValue (int) 2313 7.96%
Float getFloatValue (int, int) 800 2.75%
Write
boolean setValue (byte[] ) 16198 70.49%
boolean setValue (int, int, int) 5542 24.11%
boolean setValue (String) 627 2.73%
boolean setValue (int, int, int, int) 611 2.66%
a All methods are from the class android.bluetooth.BluetoothGattCharacteristic.
b “% of Total Methods” refers to the percentage of occurrences of a particular method for a particular data
access type (i.e., read or write), with respect to all methods that enable the same type of data access.
reads. Such methods have been listed in Table 2, and
function as the starting point for our analysis. For data
writes, the BluetoothGattCharacteristic class within the
android.bluetooth package has setValue methods that
set the locally-stored value of a characteristic. This is then
written out to the BLE peripheral. For data reads, the same
class has getValue methods, which return data that is read
from the BLE device. In a few APKs that we analyzed,
BLE data access methods were also called from within other,
vendor-specific libraries. However, we do not include these
in our analysis as they are now obsolete.
For cryptography, Android builds on the Java Cryptography
Architecture [33] and provides a number of APIs, contained
within the java.security and javax.crypto packages, for
integrating security into applications. While it is possible
for developers to implement their own algorithms, Android
recommends against this [4]. We therefore consider only calls
to these two packages as an indication of application-layer
security.
4.3 BLECryptracer
Identification of cryptographically-processed BLE data is in
essence a taint-analysis problem. For instance, a call to an
encryption method will taint the output variable that may later
be written to a BLE device. For the purpose of this paper,
when analyzing data that is read from a BLE peripheral, we
consider the getValue variants in Table 2 as sources and the
cryptography API calls as sinks. For data that is written to
the BLE device, we consider the cryptography API calls as
sources and the setValue methods as sinks.
There are a number of tools available for performing taint-
analysis, such as Flowdroid [7] and Amandroid [40]. However,
running a subset of our dataset of APKs through Amandroid
(selected because of advantages over Flowdroid and other
taint-analysis tools [34]), we found that analysis of a single
APK sometimes utilized over 10GB of RAM and took several
hours to complete. We also found through manual analysis
that many instances of cryptographically-processed data were
not identified by Amandroid, especially when the BLE func-
tions were called from third-party libraries. We therefore
developed a custom Python analysis tool called BLECryp-
tracer, to analyze all calls to BLE setValue and getValue
methods within an APK.
BLECryptracer is developed on top of Androguard [16], an
open-source reverse-engineering tool that decompiles an An-
droid APK and enables analysis of its components. Our tool
traces values to/from BLE data access functions and deter-
mines whether the data has been cryptographically processed.
To achieve this, it employs a technique for tracing register
values which is sometimes referred to as “slicing” and which
has been utilized in several static code analyses [17, 24, 35].
It also traces fields, as well as messages passed via Intents2
and certain threading functions, e.g., AsyncTask. It returns
TRUE at the first instance of cryptography that it encounters
and FALSE if it is unable to identify any application-layer
security with BLE data.
Our tool analyzes BLE reads and writes separately, as the
direction of tracing is different in the two cases. It performs
three main types of tracing, in the following order:
1. Direct trace - Attempt to identify link between BLE and
cryptography functions via direct register value transfers
and as immediate results of method invocations.
2. Associated entity trace - If the direct trace does not iden-
tify a link between source and sink, analyze abstract/in-
stance methods and other registers used in previously
analyzed function calls.
3. “Lenient” trace - If the above methods fail to return a
positive result, perform a search through all previously
encountered methods (which would have originated from
the BLE data access method), to determine if cryptogra-
phy is used anywhere within them.
2By matching the Extra identifier within the calling method.
8    28th USENIX Security Symposium USENIX Association
Table 3: Accuracy Statistics
Access Tool Confidence App Seta Detectedb TP FP TN FN Precision Recall F-measure
Read
Amandroid N/A 92 49 44 5 10 33 90% 57% 70%
BLECryptracer
High 92 62 58 4 11 19 94% 75% 83%
Medium 30 11 7 4 7 12 64% 37% 47%
Low 19 12 8 4 3 4 67% 67% 67%
Write
Amandroid N/A 92 56 49 7 8 28 88% 64% 74%
BLECryptracer
High 92 50 46 4 11 31 92% 60% 72%
Medium 42 22 19 3 8 12 86% 61% 72%
Low 20 10 5 5 3 7 50% 42% 45%
a Number of APKs tested. Note that, for confidence levels Medium and Low, we don’t consider the APKs detected at higher
confidence levels.
b The number of APKs that were identified as having cryptographically protected BLE data.
The first trace method will produce results that are most
likely to actually have cryptographically-processed BLE data,
as the coarse-grained analysis performed in the subsequent
methods adds increasing amounts of uncertainty. For this
reason, BLECryptracer assigns “confidence levels” of High,
Medium and Low to its output, which correspond to the three
trace methods above, to indicate how certain it is of the result.
We evaluate these confidence levels against a modified version
of the DroidBench benchmarking suite in Section 4.4.1. Note
that BLECryptracer only looks for application-layer security
in benign applications, and these confidence levels apply only
when deliberate manipulations (i.e., malicious obfuscation
techniques) are not employed to hide the data flow between
source and sink.
Appendix A describes the tracing mechanism in greater
detail, and also outlines how BLECryptracer combats the
effects of obfuscation in benign applications.
4.4 Evaluation
We evaluated BLECryptracer, in terms of both accuracy and
execution times. For comparison purposes, we have included
test results from Amandroid as well.
4.4.1 Accuracy Measures
At present, there is no dataset of real-world APKs with known
use of cryptographically-processed BLE data, i.e., ground
truth. Therefore, in order to test our tool against different
data transfer mechanisms, we re-factored the DroidBench
benchmarking suite [21] for the BLE case.
Each DroidBench test application was cloned twice and
modified so the data flow between the sources and sinks would
be from getValue to a cryptography method invocation, and
from the cryptography method invocation to setValue, to
emulate cryptographically-processed reads and writes, respec-
tively. Some DroidBench test cases were excluded as they
were found to be irrelevant due to differences in the objectives
of DroidBench and our test set, e.g., applications that employ
emulator detection or which leak contextual information in
exceptions. Further, applications where BLE data is written
to or read from files, or which contain data leaks in inactive
code segments were not included (as our aim is to determine
whether or not BLE data is cryptographically-processed). In
total, we created 184 APKs: 92 for reads and 92 for writes.
We executed BLECryptracer against our benchmarking test
set, analyzed the results and obtained performance metrics in
terms of the three different confidence levels. The statistics
differ based on the type of access that is analyzed (i.e., reads
vs. writes) due to differences in the tracing mechanisms. The
same test set was also used against Amandroid for comparison.
Table 3 presents the performance metrics for both tools.
In the case of BLECryptracer results, the metrics are with
respect to the total analyzed APKs at each confidence level.
That is, because lower confidence levels analyze only those
APKs that do not get detected at higher levels, accurate met-
rics can only be derived by considering the set of APKs that
were actually analyzed at each level. For example, when con-
sidering the analysis of BLE reads, while the entire dataset
of 92 APKs is relevant for confidence level High, only the 30
APKs that do not result in a TRUE outcome at level High will
be analyzed for confidence level Medium. This also means
that, when obtaining performance metrics for confidence level
High, all TRUE results obtained at levels Medium and Low
are taken to be FALSE.
The DroidBench test set, and hence our benchmarking suite,
is an imbalanced dataset, containing far more samples with
leaks (77) than without (15). For this reason, metrics such as
accuracy are not suitable for analyzing the performance of
our tool when executed against this test set, as they are more
susceptible to skew [23,26]. For our analysis, we compare the
combined True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate
(FPR), and the combined precision-recall instead, in-line with
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taint-analysis evaluations [36].
Table 3 presents the precision and recall (i.e., TPR) for
both BLECryptracer and Amandroid. We further derive FPRs
for both tools. With BLECryptracer, when analyzing reads,
False Positive Rates steadily increase as the confidence level
reduces, as expected, with values of 27% for confidence level
High, 36% for Medium and 57% for Low. When analyzing
writes, the values are 27%, 27% and 63%, respectively. Re-
gardless of the data access mechanism being tested, BLE-
Cryptracer (considering only the results at High confidence,
for a fairer comparison) performs better than Amandroid in
terms of FPR, with 27% vs. 33% for reads and 27% vs. 47%
for writes. Precision values are also better in the case of BLE-
Cryptracer for both reads and writes. In terms of the True
Positive Rate, BLECryptracer performs better than Aman-
droid for reads at 75% vs. 57%, and slightly worse for writes
at 60% vs. 64%. These results show that, overall, BLECryp-
tracer performs better than Amandroid for analyzing the use
of cryptography with BLE data.
It should be noted that three of the four False Positives
obtained by BLECryptracer at the High confidence level were
due to the order in which variables are assigned values (i.e.,
lifecycle events), which is not tested for by BLECryptracer.
Other data transfer mechanisms not tested for are Looper
and Messenger functions, which generate False Negatives.
The remaining False Positive was due to the presence of
method aliasing and was also identified as a False Positive
by Amandroid. In addition, the unexpectedly low TPR (i.e.,
recall) at level Medium for reads is due to the relatively few
cases analyzed at that level when compared to High.
4.4.2 Execution Times
We also compared BLECryptracer and Amandroid in terms of
speed of execution. For this, we ran the two tools against a ran-
dom subset of 2,000 APKs and compared time-to-completion
in both cases. We imposed a maximum run-time of 30 minutes
per APK for both tools, and only compared execution times
for those cases where Amandroid did not time out (approxi-
mately 40% of the tested APKs timed out when analyzed by
Amandroid. In comparison, fewer than 2% of APKs timed
out when analyzed by BLECryptracer).
Figure 4 plots the time taken to analyze BLE writes using
BLECryptracer vs. Amandroid. The figure shows that analysis
times with BLECryptracer were, for the most part, around 3-4
minutes per application. We observed no obvious correlation
between the size of the application’s dex file and the execu-
tion time, for either tool. APKs that took longer to process
with BLECryptracer were predominantly of confidence level
“Medium”, which indicates that the longer analysis times may
simply have been because of having to first go through the
most stringent analysis (at the highest confidence level). For
Amandroid, the execution times vary to a greater extent than
with BLECryptracer, due to the difference in the mechanisms
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Figure 4: Comparison of time taken to execute BLECryptracer
vs. Amandroid, when analyzing BLE writes.
employed for performing the analysis.
4.5 Results from Large-Scale APK Analysis
We executed BLECryptracer against our dataset of 18,929
APKs. 192 APKs timed out when analyzing reads and 220
APKs timed out when analyzing writes, when a maximum
runtime of 30 minutes was imposed. These APKs were re-
tested with an increased runtime of 60 minutes. However,
even with the longer analysis time, 44 and 76 APKs timed out
for reads and writes, respectively, and had to be excluded from
further analysis. In addition, approximately 90 APKs could
not be processed via Androguard’s AnalyzeAPK method and
were excluded.
Due to the differences in performance metrics obtained
for the three confidence levels during testing (as mentioned
in Section 4.4), we focus on only those results that either
identify cryptography at confidence level High or those where
no cryptography was identified at all.
4.5.1 Presence of App-Layer Security with BLE Data
Our results show that approximately 95% of BLE-enabled
APKs call the javax.crypto and java.security cryptog-
raphy libraries somewhere within their code. While this is a
large proportion of APKs, the results also indicate that a much
smaller percentage of APKs use cryptographically processed
data with BLE reads and writes (approximately 25% for both,
identified with High confidence). In fact, about 46% of APKs
that perform BLE reads and 54% of those that perform BLE
writes (corresponding to 2,379 million and 2,075 million cu-
mulative installations, respectively) do not implement security
for the BLE data. Interestingly, of the 16,131 APKs that called
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Figure 5: Analysis results depicting the presence of
cryptographically-processed data with BLE writes and reads,
with breakdown according to Confidence Level.
both BLE read and write functions, about 36% (i.e., more than
5,700 APKs), with a cumulative download count of 1,005 mil-
lion, do not implement application-layer security for either
type of data access. Figure 5 summarizes the proportion of
APKs that were identified as containing cryptographically
protected BLE data at the three different confidence levels.
4.5.2 Libraries vs. App-Specific Implementations
We found that many BLE-enabled APKs actually use third-
party libraries for incorporating BLE functionality. To get
an idea of exactly how many APKs relied on libraries, we
analyze all methods within an APK that called BLE data
access functions. To do this in an automated way, we compare
the method class name with the application package name. If
the first two components (e.g., com.packagename) of each
match, then we take it to be a method implemented within
the application. If the components do not match, we take it
to be a library method. If the package name uses country-
code second-level domains (e.g., uk.ac.packagename), then
we compare the third components as well.
Of the APKs that called the setValue method, 63%
used BLE functionality solely through libraries, 32% used
application-specific methods only, while 4% used both. Fewer
than 1% of the APKs could not be analyzed due to very short
method names. Within the APKs that used both application-
specific methods and libraries, around 34% used an external
library to provide Device Firmware Update (DFU) capabili-
ties, thereby enabling the BLE peripheral to be updated via the
mobile application. Of the APKs that utilized only application-
specific methods to incorporate BLE functionality, 67% did
not implement application-layer security with the BLE data.
This proportion was lower at 48% for applications that relied
on libraries.
In the case of the APKs that called getValue variants,
37% used only application-specific methods, 58% used only
libraries, and 5% used both. As with the setValue case, a
higher proportion of APKs that used only app-specific BLE
implementations were found to not use cryptography (60%),
when compared with those that used only libraries (39%).
Table 4 presents the ten most commonly-encountered
BLE libraries, their functionality, the number of APKs that
use them, and the presence of cryptographically-processed
BLE data within the library itself. The table shows that
the most prevalent third-party packages are libraries that
enable communication with BLE beacons. In fact, a single
such library (Estimote) made up more than 90% of all in-
stances of cryptographically-processed BLE writes and 85%
of cryptographically-processed BLE reads (identified with
High confidence). An analysis of this library suggested that
cryptography is being used to authenticate requests when
modifying settings on the beacon.
Apart from beacon libraries, we identified five libraries
that function as wrappers for the Android BLE API. For
example, Polidea wraps the API so that it adheres to the
reactive programming paradigm. The libraries Randdusing,
Megster and Evothings enable the use of BLE via JavaScript
in Cordova-based applications. Similarly, Chromium enables
websites to access BLE devices via JavaScript calls. None
of these libraries handle cryptographically-processed BLE
data. It is expected that developers using these libraries will
implement their own application-layer security (using either
JavaScript or reactive Java as appropriate).
Of the two remaining libraries, Flic, which uses
cryptographically-processed data, is a library offered by a
BLE device manufacturer. This library allows third-party
developers to integrate their services into the Flic ecosystem,
to allow them to automate certain tasks.
Finally, Nordicsemi is a library provided by a BLE chipset
manufacturer to enable DFU over the BLE interface. With the
newest version of the DFU mechanism, the BLE peripheral
verifies that the firmware has been properly signed. Devices
using the legacy DFU mechanism will not verify the firmware.
However, the mobile application (and by extension, the li-
brary) does not need to handle cryptographically-processed
data in either case.
4.5.3 Cryptographic Correctness
BLECryptracer identified 3,228 unique packages with crypto-
graphically protected BLE data (with either reads or writes),
with High confidence. However, the presence of crypto-
libraries does not in itself indicate a secure system. We there-
fore further analyzed this subset of APKs to identify whether
cryptography had been used correctly in them. The tool Cog-
niCrypt [29] was utilized for this purpose. Although this tool
does not formally verify the cryptographic protocol between
the application and the BLE peripheral, it identifies various
misuses of the Java crypto/security libraries.
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Table 4: Top Ten Third-Party BLE Libraries
Library Function #APKs[unique] Crypto
Estimote Beacon 3980[2804] Yes
Nordicsemia DFU 1238[847] No
Kontakt Beacon 1108[690] No
Chromium Web BLE 402[269] No
Randdusing Cordova Plugin 268[188] No
Megster Cordova Plugin 317[187] No
Flic BLE Accessory 173[164] Yes
Polidea BLE Wrapper 138[114] No
Evothings Cordova Plugin 142[84] No
Jaalee Beacon 102[79] No
a Significant overlap present between Estimote and Nordic due
to repackaging of the Nordic SDK into Estimote.
Among the 3,228 unique packages, we found that there
was significant overlap between APKs in terms of the BLE
libraries or functions3 used. Removing such duplicates re-
sulted in a set of 194 APKs. Of these, 68 were identified by
CogniCrypt as having issues. However, because CogniCrypt
identifies cryptography misuse within the entire APK, the re-
sults were filtered for BLE-specific functions. 24 APKs were
found to have issues within or associated with the methods
that cryptographically processed BLE data (as identified by
BLECryptracer) and often, a single APK exhibited multiple
issues. Table 5 shows the different types of misuse encoun-
tered and the number of unique packages that were identified
as having such misuse. Note that because this analysis was
performed over unique packages, the number of APKs that
misuse crypto-libraries will be higher.
We manually analyzed the 24 APKs that were flagged by
CogniCrypt as having BLE-relevant issues, and examined
the identified instances of bad cipher modes and hardcoded
keys/Initialization Vectors (IVs). With regard to insecure
block cipher modes, we found that explicit use of ECB was
prevalent (9 out of 10 cases), but there was also one case
where Cipher.getInstance("AES") was used without the
mode being specified, which may default to ECB depending
on the cryptographic provider. When analyzing keys, we ob-
served that several applications directly contained hardcoded
keys as byte arrays or strings. Three applications retrieved
keys from JSON files. In two cases, keys were generated from
the ANDROID_ID, which is a system setting that is readable by
all applications. We also observed one instance where a key
was obtained from a server via HTTP (not HTTPS).
3There are instances where two applications may have unique package
names, but which actually incorporate much the same functionality. This is
often the case when the same developer produces branded variants of an appli-
cation for different clients in a single industry. For example, two applications
could have unique package names com.myapp.app1 and com.myapp.app2,
but their functionality may be derived from a common codebase com.myapp.
Table 5: Number of Packages with Cryptographic Misuse
Misuse Typea #Unique Packages
ECB (or other bad mode) 10
Non-random key 6
Non-random IV 10
Bad IV used with Cipher 7
Bad key used with Cipher 11
Incomplete operation (dead code) 4
a Description of misuse based on [17, 30].
This analysis shows that several real-world applications
contain basic mistakes in their use of crypto-libraries and
handling of sensitive data, which means that the BLE data
will not be secure despite the use of cryptography.
4.5.4 Trends over Time
Figure 6 shows the trend of application-layer security over
time for applications that incorporate calls to BLE reads or
writes. The graph depicts the percentage of applications that
do not have cryptographic protection for either type of access.
The overall downward trend suggests that there has been some
improvement in application-layer security between the years
2014 and 2017 (we refrain from making observations about
APKs from 2013 as they were very few in number, and about
APKs from 2018 as the dataset is not yet fully populated for
this year). However, it should be noted that, even in 2017,
which had the smallest percentage of APKs without cryptog-
raphy, these APKs corresponded to 128 million downloads,
which is a significant number.
4.5.5 Application-Layer Security by Category
The percentage of applications that use cryptographically
processed data from each major application category has been
graphed in Figure 7. While it would be reasonable to expect
that most “Medical” applications would implement some level
of application-layer security, the results show that fewer than
30% of applications under this category actually have such
protection mechanisms. However, it is possible that the reason
for this is that the devices implement the standard Bluetooth
SIG adopted profiles, which do not mandate any security
apart from pairing, as mentioned in Section 3.3. In fact, of the
APKs categorized under “Medical” and with no cryptographic
protection for either reads or writes, we found that three of
the top ten (in terms of installations) contained identifiers for
the standard Bluetooth Glucose Service.
Perhaps surprisingly, APKs that are categorized under
“Business”, “Shopping” and “Travel & Local” appear to be
the most likely to incorporate application-layer security, with
around 50% of all such applications being identified as having
12    28th USENIX Security Symposium USENIX Association
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
40
60
80
100
Year
%
A
PK
s
w
ith
no
C
ry
pt
og
ra
ph
y
Figure 6: Application-layer security trends over time. Notes:
Graph depicts APKs that perform BLE reads or writes, and
have no cryptographic protection for either. APKs with dates
that are invalid [39] or older than 2012 (when native BLE
support was introduced for Android) have not been included.
cryptographically processed BLE data with High confidence.
However, in over 85% of such occurrences, this was found to
be due to the Estimote beacon library.
4.5.6 Impact Analysis
While 18,929 BLE-enabled applications may seem like a rel-
atively small number of applications when compared with
the initial dataset of 4.6 million+, a single application may
correspond to multiple BLE devices, sometimes even millions
of devices as is the case with fitness trackers [25]. For exam-
ple, even if we consider the slightly restrictive case of unique
applications that do not use cryptography with either reads or
writes, the cumulative install count is still in excess of 1,005
million. This shows that the attack surface is much larger than
may be indicated by the number of APKs.
It is of course a possibility that the data that is read from
a BLE peripheral has no impact on user security or privacy
(e.g., device battery levels). Understanding the data within
APKs would require a more complex static analysis and is
left as future work.
4.6 Case Study: Firmware Update over BLE
When analyzing our results, we found that one of the APKs
that was identified as not having application-layer security
was designed for use with a fitness tracker from our test device
set. The tracker is a low-cost model that, based on the install
count on Google Play (1,000,000+), appears to be widely
used. An analysis of the APK suggested that the device used
the Nordic BLE chipset, which could be put into the Legacy
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Figure 7: Presence of application-layer security in differ-
ent categories of applications, averaged over BLE reads and
writes, and broken down by confidence level. Only unique
packages have been taken into consideration. APKs that do
not currently have a presence on Google Play have been ex-
cluded, as their category cannot be identified.
DFU mode, which does not require the firmware to be signed.
To exploit this, we developed an APK that, in accordance with
the attacks described in Section 3.1, connects to the device,
sends commands to place it in DFU mode, and then writes a
new modified firmware to the device without user intervention.
The updated firmware in this case was a simple, innocuous
modification of the original firmware. However, given that
the device can be configured to receive notifications from
other applications, a malicious firmware could be developed
in such a way that, for example, all notifications (including
second-factor authentication SMS messages or end-to-end
encrypted messages) are routed to the malicious application
that installed the firmware.
This attack was possible because the BLE peripheral did
not verify the firmware (e.g., via digital signatures) nor the
source application (via application-layer security). We have
informed the application developer of the issue (02 Nov 2018),
but have received no response as of the date of submission of
this manuscript (18 May 2019).
While our attack was crafted for a specific device, it does
demonstrate that attacks against these types of devices are rel-
atively easy. An attacker could easily embed several firmware
images within a single mobile application, to target a range
of vulnerable devices.
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4.7 Limitations
In this section, we outline some limitations, either in our script
or due to the inherent nature of our experiments, that may have
impacted our results.
4.7.1 Unhandled Data Transfer Mechanisms
As mentioned in Section 4.4, BLECryptracer does not analyze
data that is written out to file (including shared preferences),
or communicated out to a different application, because it is
not straightforward (and many times, not possible) to deter-
mine how data will be handled once it has been transferred out
of the application under analysis. It is also possible that an ap-
plication obtains the data to be written to a BLE device from,
or forwards the data read from a BLE device to, another entity,
such as a remote server. That is, the Android application could
merely act as a “shuttle” for the data, which means that an
analysis of the APK would not show evidence of usage of
cryptography libraries. However, the transfer of data to/from
a remote server does not in itself indicate cryptographically-
processed data, as plain-text values can also be transmitted in
the same manner. We therefore do not analyze instances of
data transfers to external entities.
BLECryptracer also does not handle data transfers between
a source and sink when only one of them is processed within
an Looper function or when the data is transmitted via mes-
sages. However, when we logged instances of where such
functions were called during a trace, we found that of the
APKs that utilized such data transfer mechanisms, a large
percentage were identified as having cryptographic protection
via other data flows. In fact, of the 8,834 APKs where cryp-
tography was not identified with BLE writes, only 501 APKs
interacted with Looper or Messenger, and an even smaller
percentage of APKs were affected for BLE reads.
4.7.2 Conditional Statements with Backtracing
When backtracing a register, BLECryptracer stops when it
encounters a constant value assignment. However, it is pos-
sible that this value assignment occurs within one branch of
a conditional jump, which means that another possible value
could be contained within another branch further up the in-
struction list. To identify this, the script would have to first
trace forward within the instruction list, identify all possible
conditional jumps, and then trace back from the register of
interest for all branches. This would need to be performed
for every method that is analyzed and could result in a much
longer processing time per APK file, as well as potentially
unnecessary overheads.
5 Related Work
User privacy has received particular attention in the BLE re-
search community because several widely-used BLE devices,
such as fitness trackers and continuous glucose monitors, are
intended to always be on the user’s person, thereby potentially
leaking information about the user’s whereabouts at all times.
Some of the research has focused on the threats to privacy
based on user location tracking [15,19], while others explored
the possibility of obtaining personal user data from fitness
applications or devices [14, 28].
While our research is concerned with data access and user
privacy, we focus more on the impact on privacy and security
due to how the BLE standard has been implemented in mobile
device architectures, as well as how it is applied by applica-
tion developers in general, rather than due to individual BLE
firmware design.
The work that is most closely related to ours is the re-
search by Naveed, et al., which explored the implications of
shared communication channels on Android devices [31]. In
their paper, the authors discussed the issue of Classic Blue-
tooth and NFC channels being shared by multiple applications
on the same device. They then demonstrated unauthorized
data access attacks against (Classic) Bluetooth-enabled med-
ical devices. The authors also performed an analysis of 68
Bluetooth-enabled applications that handled private user data,
and concluded that the majority of them offered no protection
against this attack. Finally, they proposed an operating-system
level control for mitigating the attack.
Our work specifically targets pairing-protected character-
istics on BLE devices, because BLE appears to slowly be
replacing Classic Bluetooth in the personal health and home
security domains. We demonstrate that the BLE data format
and access mechanisms enable even easier attacks than in the
case of Classic Bluetooth. Further, we identify the impact that
the new Android permissions model (introduced in Android
v6) has had on the user experience and on malicious appli-
cations’ capabilities. We also perform a much larger-scale
analysis over 18,900+ Android applications, to determine how
prevalent application-layer security is among BLE-enabled
applications.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the risks posed to data on Bluetooth
Low Energy devices from co-located Android applications.
We show the conditions under which an unauthorized An-
droid application would be able to access potentially sensi-
tive, pairing-protected data from a BLE peripheral, once a
co-located authorized application has paired and bonded with
a BLE peripheral, without the user being aware of the access.
We also show that, in some cases, an unauthorized application
may be able to access such protected data with fewer permis-
sions required of it than would be required of an authorized
application. We then discuss mitigation strategies in terms of
the different stakeholders in the BLE ecosystem.
We present BLECryptracer, an analysis tool for determin-
ing the presence of application-layer security with BLE data.
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We evaluate it against the taint-analysis tool Amandroid, and
present the results from executing BLECryptracer against
18,929 BLE-enabled Android APKs. Our results suggest that
over 45% of all applications, and about 70% of “Medical” ap-
plications, do not implement cryptography-based application-
layer security for BLE data. We also found, among the ap-
plications that do use cryptographically processed BLE data,
several instances of cryptography misuse, such as the use of
insecure cipher modes and hard-coded key values. We believe
that, if this situation does not change, then as more and more
sensitive use cases are proposed for BLE, the amount of pri-
vate or critical data that may be vulnerable to unauthorized
access can only increase. We hope that our work increases
awareness of this issue and prompts changes by application
developers and operating system vendors, to lead to improved
protection for BLE data.
7 Availability
The code for our BLECryptracer tool is available at
https://github.com/projectbtle/BLECryptracer
This repository also contains the SHA256 hashes of the APKs
in our dataset, and the source/sink files used for the Aman-
droid analysis. In addition, it contains source code for the
benchmarking applications, as well as a comprehensive break-
down of the results per DroidBench category.
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Appendix A: BLECryptracer Logic
We describe here the basic tracing mechanism employed
by BLECryptracer in order to identify the presence of
application-layer security for BLE data.
Backtracing BLE writes
BLE writes use one of the setValue methods in Table 2
to first set the value that is to be written, before calling the
method for performing the actual write. BLECryptracer iden-
tifies all calls to these methods, and then traces the origins of
the data held in the registers that are passed as input to the
methods.
Considering the smali4 code in Figure 8 as an example,
setValue is invoked at Line 13 and is passed two registers as
input. As setValue is an instance method, the first input, lo-
cal register v3, holds the BluetoothGattCharacteristic
object that the method is invoked on. The second input, pa-
rameter register p2, holds the data that is to be written to
the BLE device, and is the second argument that is passed
to the method a (Line 1). BLECryptracer identifies p2 as the
register that holds the data of interest, and traces backward
to determine if this data is the result of some cryptographic
processing. To achieve this, the method(s) within the APK
that invoke method a are identified, and the second input to
each such method is traced. If the BLE data had come from a
local register, rather than a parameter register, BLECryptracer
would trace back within method a’s instructions, to deter-
mine the origin of the data. This backtracing is performed
until either a crypto-library is referenced, or a const-<> or
4Android applications are typically written in Java and converted into
Dalvik bytecode. The smali format can be considered an “intermediate” step
between the high-level Java source and the bytecode.
1 .method private
a(Landroid/bluetooth/BluetoothGatt;[B...)V
2 .locals 10
3
4 .prologue
5 const/4 v9, 0x2
6 const/4 v8, 0x3
7 const/4 v7, 0x1
8 ...
9 invoke-virtual {v0, v3},
Landroid/bluetooth/BluetoothGattService;->
getCharacteristic(Ljava/util/UUID;)
Landroid/bluetooth/BluetoothGattCharacteristic;
10
11 move-result-object v3
12 ...
13 invoke-virtual {v3, p2},
Landroid/bluetooth/BluetoothGattCharacteristic;
->setValue([B)Z
14 invoke-virtual {v1, v3},
Landroid/bluetooth/BluetoothGatt;
->writeCharacteristic(Landroid/bluetooth/
BluetoothGattCharacteristic;)Z
Figure 8: Sample smali code for BLE attribute write.
new-array declaration is encountered (which would indicate
that no cryptography is used). Note that calls to any method
within the crypto-libraries mentioned in Section 4.2 are ac-
cepted as evidence of the use of cryptography with BLE data.
The tool stops processing an APK at the first instance where
such a method call is identified.
During execution, the BLECryptracer maintains a list of
registers (set within the context of a method) to be traced,
for each setValue method call within the application code.
This initially contains a single entry, which is the input to
the setValue method. A new register is added to the list if it
appears to have tainted the value of any of the registers already
in the list. This could be due to simple operations such as
aget, aput or move-<> (apart from move-result variants),
or it could be as a result of a comparison, arithmetic or logic
operation (in which case, the register holding the operand
on which the operation is performed is added to the trace
list). Similarly, if a register obtains a value from an instance
field (via sget or iget), then all instances where that field is
assigned a value are analyzed. However, the script does not
analyze the order in which the field is assigned values, as this
would require activity life-cycle awareness.
Where a register is assigned a value that is output from a
method invocation via move-result, if the method is not an
external method, then the instructions within that method are
analysed, beginning with the return value and tracing back-
wards. In some instances, the actual source of a register’s
value is obfuscated due to the use of intermediate formatting
functions. In an attempt to overcome this, BLECryptracer
traces the inputs to called methods as well. Further, if a regis-
ter is used as input to a method, then all other registers that are
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1 .method public onCharacteristicread(Landroid/bluetooth/
BluetoothGatt;Landroid/bluetooth/
BluetoothGattCharacteristic;I)V
2 ...
3 invoke-virtual {p2}, Landroid/bluetooth/
BluetoothGattCharacteristic;->getValue()[B
4 move-result-object v0
5 new-instance v2, Ljava/lang/StringBuilder;
6 invoke-direct {v2},
Ljava/lang/StringBuilder;-><init>()V
7 const-string v3, "read value: "
8 invoke-virtual {v2, v3},
Ljava/lang/StringBuilder;->append(Ljava/lang/
String;)Ljava/lang/StringBuilder;
9 move-result-object v2
10 invoke-static {v0},
Ljava/util/Arrays;->toString([B)Ljava/lang/ String;
11 move-result-object v3
12 invoke-virtual {v2, v3},
Ljava/lang/StringBuilder;->append(Ljava/lang/
String;)Ljava/lang/StringBuilder;
13 move-result-object v2
14 ...
Figure 9: Sample smali code for BLE attribute read.
inputs to the method are also added to the trace list. While this
captures some indirect value assignments, it runs the risk of
false positives. For this reason, we have included the concept
of Confidence Levels for the code output.
If, for an APK, the input to the setValue method can be
backtraced to cryptography directly, via only register value
transfers and as immediate results of method invocations, then
a confidence level of “High” is assigned to the result. If a reg-
ister cannot be traced back directly to a cryptographic output,
but if an indirect trace identifies the use of a cryptography
library, then a confidence level of “Medium” is assigned. Fi-
nally, in the event that no cryptography use is identified at
High or Medium confidence levels, the script performs a less
stringent search through all the instructions of the methods
that it previously analyzed. This risks including instances
of cryptography use with functions unrelated to BLE and is
therefore assigned a “Low” confidence level.
Forward-tracing BLE reads
With BLE reads, a getValue variant is invoked and the output,
i.e., the value that is read, is moved to a register. To trace this
value, BLECryptracer identifies all calls to getValue variants,
then traces the output registers and all registers they taint
until either a crypto-library is referenced or the register value
changes. Such value changes can occur due to new-array,
new-instance and const declarations, as well as by being
assigned the output of various operations (such as method
invocations or arithmetic/logic operations).
With forward-tracing, the register holding the BLE data is
considered to taint another if, for example, the source register
is used in a method invocation, or comparison/arithmetic/logic
operation, whose result is assigned to the destination register.
The destination register is then added to the trace list. When
a register is used as input to a method, then along with the
output of that method, the use of the register within the method
is also analyzed.
This method of analysis tends to result in a “tree” of traces.
As an example, considering the smali code in Figure 9, the
byte array output from the BLE read is stored in register
v0 (Line 4). This taints register v3 via a format conversion
function (Lines 10 and 11), which in turn taints v2 via a
java.lang.StringBuilder function (Lines 12 and 13). At
this point, all three registers are tainted and will be traced
until their values change.
The forward-tracing mode also assigns one of three
confidence levels to its output. “High” is assigned when
cryptographically-processed data is identified via the tracing
mechanism above; “Medium” is when the use of cryptogra-
phy is identified by tracing classes that implement interfaces.
“Low” is assigned when a less stringent search through all
encountered methods results in identification of a reference
to a cryptography library (similar to the backtracing case).
Handling obfuscation
APKs sometimes employ obfuscation techniques to protect
against reverse-engineering, and the question then arises as
to whether these techniques may impact the results of our
analysis. We therefore briefly discuss different obfuscation
techniques and why they do not impact our tool.
One of the most common techniques is identifier renam-
ing, where identifiers within the code are replaced with short,
meaningless names. However, because Androguard operates
on smali (rather than Java) code, BLECryptracer is able to
overcome the challenges posed by this technique. String en-
cryption is another obfuscation mechanism, but it again does
not affect the output of our tool as BLECryptracer does not
search for hard-coded strings. Further, our tool was verified
successfully against three out of four benchmarking applica-
tions that utilized reflection. The most complex obfuscation
techniques are packing and runtime-based obfuscation, but
these are typically employed by malware. Because we are
looking for vulnerable (not malicious) applications, we do not
consider these techniques. Therefore, in general, we believe
our analysis to be unaffected by most benign obfuscation
mechanisms.
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